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Executive Summary
This report evaluates eight key business 
support measures, six of  them funded 
by the European Union (EU) structural 
funds and two guaranteed by the Gov-
ernment. The evaluation was carried out 
in 2006-2007 and for most of  the meas-
ures it covers the years 2003-2004. We 
looked at the relevance, efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of  the measures. A “bottom-
up” approach was applied through web 
survey of  beneficiaries and interviews 
with firm’s managers or project manag-
ers. This paper summarises the features 
applying to more than one measure. 
The evaluated grants were predomi-
nantly relevant and compatible with the 
objectives specified in national economic 
policy documents. An exception was the 
consultancy grant meant for strategic 
counselling but used mainly for prepar-
ing project proposals. 
While the usage rate of  support money 
is good there were also some shortcom-
ings in terms of  efficiency. First, appli-
cation process and subsequent reporting 
have been very costly to firms. Second, 
regular overviews or electronic data-
bases were missing for many important 
indicators.
In terms of  overall impacts start-up grant 
was the most and export plan program 
the least successful. Additionality also 
varies greatly across the measures de-
pending both on the type of  support, the 
co-financing terms and the risk level of  
the projects. It was the smallest in case of  
low-risk infrastructure projects and the 
greatest in case of  start-up and training 
grants. Effectiveness could be improved 
by better adhering to the preferences es-
tablished in the national development 
plan (NDP), by using a stage-based ap-
proach in the case of  long-term projects 
(1-3 years) to overcome the current rigid-
ness of  programs’ terms and conditions, 
and by additionally varying the co-financ-
ing rate according to project type and/or 
duration. The study also revealed changes 
in the behaviour of  firms and many posi-
tive spillovers, although sustainability and 
spillovers varied across grants.
1 The project was  initiated and funded by the Ministry of  Economic Affairs and Communications. The full reports of  the evaluation project are 
available at www.praxis.ee.
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2Introduction
This report evaluates eight business sup-
port measures, six of  them funded by the 
European Union (EU) structural funds 
and two guaranteed by the Government. 
These measures fall under the four broad 
areas of  business support:
1. Improving Access to Finance for 
Enterprises
a. Start-up grant
b. Business infrastructure grant
c. Business loan guarantees
2. Human Resource Development
a. Training grant
b. Consultancy grant
3. Supporting Enterprises’ Export 
Opportunities
a. Export plan program
b. Export guarantees
4. Supporting Research and Develop-
ment 
a. Support for R&D projects
The evaluation was carried out in 2006-
2007 and for most of  the measures it 
covers the years 2003-2004. The goal of  
the evaluation was to analyse whether 
support measures are still relevant and 
comply with economic policy objectives, 
and to make recommendations on how 
to improve, if  necessary, the grants and 
their implementation principles. It was a 
first comprehensive impact evaluation of  
the EU structural funds in Estonia. 
For each support measure a separate de-
tailed report was prepared. This paper 
summarises the features applying to more 
than one measure.
1. Short background on 
business support policy
The evaluated schemas are the instruments 
of  enterprise and innovation policies. In 
contrast to the initial stages of  transition, 
by the late 1990s government policy was 
beginning to place more explicit emphasis 
on encouraging and supporting small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) develop-
ment. In 2002, Estonian Enterprise Policy 
document “Enterprising Estonia - Nation-
al Policy for the Development of  SMEs in 
Estonia in 2001-2006” was elaborated. It 
recognized, firstly, that SMEs may suffer 
from size-related market failures; and sec-
ondly, the potential contribution of  SMEs 
to job generation and to regional develop-
ment. The aims of  Enterprise Policy were 
to favour enterprising spirit, create new jobs 
and improve the competitiveness of  Esto-
nian businesses. The main priority activities 
were connected with development of  hu-
man resources, improvement of  access to 
finance, development of  the business sup-
port structure, distribution of  information 
and reduction of  administrative burdens. 
The most important research, develop-
ment and innovation (RD&I) policy 
outline was the Estonian R&D Strategy 
“Knowledge-based Estonia” for the years 
2002-2006. The strategy underlined the 
national consensus on the importance of  
RD&I for the future economic develop-
ment and set out the strategic goals and 
courses of  action. Two key complementa-
ry priorities were identified as strengthen-
ing of  the knowledge base and increasing 
the competitiveness of  enterprises. The 
strategy also defined key areas for sup-
port and foresaw increase of  resources 
for these areas which were: user-friendly 
information technologies, biotechnology, 
and materials’ technologies. 
All the described objectives were re-
flected in the Estonian National Devel-
opment Plan 2004-2006 (NDP) which 
formed the basis for distribution of  the 
EU structural funds over these years. In 
order to meet the objectives of  NDP, sev-
eral grant schemas were developed and 
co-financed from EU structural funds, 
including six of  the evaluated schemas:
The results were 
used in develop-
ing new policy 
measures.
The evaluated 
measures were 
the key instru-
ments of enter-
prise and inno-
vation policy.
3• start-up grant for establishing new 
companies, 
• training grant for human resource de-
velopment, 
• consultancy grant for engaging exter-
nal advice to support company’s de-
velopment, 
• export plan program to increase suc-
cess of  marketing activities in interna-
tional markets, 
• business infrastructure development 
grant to overcome shortcomings in 
business environment,
• support for financing the R&D 
projects of  companies. 
All these measures were managed by 
special institution – Enterprise Estonia 
(EE).
The other two schemas were managed by 
the Credit and Export Guarantee Fund 
KredEx:
• business loan and leasing guarantee 
for companies to overcome collateral 
problems,
• export guarantee for exporters to di-
minish the risks of  export activities.
Uptake of  the programs is presented in 
Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1. Financing of the EE’s business support programs in 2003-2005 
 Start-up program Consultancy 
program
Training 
program
Business infra-
structure develop-
ment program
R&D financing 
program
Export plan 
program*
 2003 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Applications 380 668 331 328 496 466 807 65 279 111 40 94 59 na 67 64
Approved  applications 170 193 153 189 412 267 615 45 44 66 26 61 46 62 47 36
Rate of approval 45% 29% 46% 58% 83% 57% 76% 69% 16% 59% 65% 65% 78% na 70% 56%
Supported  companies 170 193 153 186 384 242 460 36 39 65 25 46 43 62 47 36
Total size of the grant (mil EEK) na 27,3 18,5 6,4 11,9 9,1 29,4 32 60 66 42,6 141 69,8 na 41,8 31,4
Total size of the projects (mil EEK) na 42 32 12,9 24,5 14 47,5 na 132 149 na 218 114 na 85,3 62,9
Average grant (thous EEK) na 141 121 34 29 34 48 711 1364 1000 1638 2305 1517 na 889 872
Source: Enterprise Estonia, calculations of the authors. 
* - Includes only implementation phase. 
na – not available.
Table 2. Financing of the KredEx’s short-term export guarantees, business loan and leasing guarantees in 
2001-2006 (number, mil EEK)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOTAL
Export guarantees        
Applications 62 93 240 505 350 251 1 501
New contracts 37 51 151 408 314 203 1 164
Rate of approval (%) 60% 55% 63% 81% 90% 81% 78%
Guaranteed firms 14 20 56 96 77 65 160
Guaranteed credit limit 53 42 130 326 352 186 na
Guaranteed export turnover 31 112 167 648 742 588 2 288
Investment and leasing guarantees*        
New contracts 60 126 97 130 130 170 713
Total loans (mil EEK) 197 402 199 317 300 537 1 952
Total guarantees (mil EEK) 78 156 95 152 159 231 871
Investment loans        
Applications 72 134 104 119 119 163 688
New contracts 60 104 85 110 110 157 626
Rate of approval (%) 83% 78% 82% 92% 92% 96% 87%
Total loans (mil EEK) 197 273 176 236 254 509 1 645
Total guarantees (mil EEK) 78 129 88 133 143 220 791
Leasing        
New contracts  22 12 20 20 13 87
Total loans (mil EEK)  129 23 81 46 28 307
Total guarantees (mil EEK)  27 7 19 16 11 80
Source: KredEx, calculations of the authors.
* - Table is imprecise for the contracts for which the amount of guarantee has been changed during the contract period. 
na – not available.
Measures were 
managed by two 
special bodies —  
Enterprise 
Estonia and 
KredEx.
42. Methodology
2.1. Evaluation Questions
Evaluation focused on questions wheth-
er grants are still relevant and whether 
the implemented activities have achieved 
their targets. In case of  all grants the fol-
lowing general questions were examined:
1. Relevance – do grants meet the needs 
of  beneficiaries and are in line with 
market situation; if  and what changes 
are needed in programs?
2. Efficiency – can the impacts be achieved 
by using resources more efficiently? 
3. Effectiveness – how have the grants 
impacted financial outcomes of  
the firms; have firms implemented 
planned activities and achieved their 
goals; do the results and impacts per-
sist after the end of  projects?
Depending on the differences in analysed 
implementation periods of  measures, 
time lags in the occurrence of  impacts 
and gaps in the knowledge of  policymak-
ers needed for planning respective strate-
gies and activities, the emphasis on evalu-
ation questions varied by measures.
2.2. Methodology3
SME policy impacts can be measured at 
both macro and micro (project) level. In 
this project “bottom-up” (or project 
based) approach was applied and main-
ly qualitative methods were used for two 
reasons. First, in addition to analysing im-
pacts, the objective of  the evaluation was 
to gather information on the relevance 
and functioning of  the measures. And 
second, in 2004 the size of  programs was 
still small and this makes macro level im-
pact assessment difficult.4
Storey has classified different methods 
of  evaluating SME policies calling it “six 
steps to heaven” with sophistication in-
creasing from the Step 1 describing “Take 
up of  schemes” to Step 6 ”Taking account 
of  selection bias”.5 At the same time one 
must keep in mind that the goals and 
measures of  SME policies are very di-
verse. Therefore the optimal methodology 
varies across measures depending on the 
strength of  causality, the cost of  evalua-
tion, program size and relevance etc.6 For 
training grant with weak causality between 
input and results it is costly to use sophis-
ticated methods, but for investment grants 
the causality is much stronger and more 
rigorous methods are suitable.7 Since we 
want to compare the impacts of  differ-
ent measures it is important to use same 
methodology for all measures. Otherwise 
the results are not comparable and the im-
pacts gotten by using simpler methods will 
probably be relatively overestimated.8 As 
this project covers diverse measures, in-
cluding soft policy measures like training 
and consultancy grant, we used the simpler 
method of  beneficiaries’ own assessment 
to assess additionality (Step 3). In addition, 
we took into account observation that one 
should avoid assessing additionality merely 
by beneficiaries’ own assessments because 
these often overestimate the impacts com-
pared, for example, to secondary data like 
financial statements.9 For that reason we 
used interviewers’ assessment whenever 
possible.10
EE support measures
Evaluation is based primarily on web 
survey of  beneficiaries and semi-
structured personal interviews with 
firms’ managers or project manag-
ers. The latter’s goal was to get detailed 
information on program implementa-
3 Detailed description of  methodology is given in each measure’s report. 
4 English Partnerships (2004). Additionality Guide. English Partnerships. 2^nd ed. September 2004. 
5 Storey, D (1998). Six Steps to Heaven. CSME Working Paper No. 59. September 1998.
6 Rossi, Peter, Howard Freeman, and Mark Lipsey (1999). Evaluation: A Systematic Approach. 6th ed. SAGE Publications.
7 OECD (2004). Evaluation of  SME Policies and Programmes. Paris: OECD.
8 EIM Business and Policy Research (2004). Review of  Methods to Measure the Effectiveness of  State Aid to SMEs. Zoetemeer: EIM.
9 Venetoklis, Takis (2000). Methods Applied in Evaluating Business Subsidy Programs: A Survey. VATT Research Reports 106, Government
 Institute for Economic Research (VATT) 
10 HM Treasury (1995). A Framework for the Evaluation of  Regeneration Projects and Programmes. London, January 1995.
“Bottom-up” 
approach was 
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mainly qualita-
tive methods 
were used.
The evaluation 
is based on the 
web survey of 
beneficiaries 
and personal 
interviews.
5tion and impacts on beneficiaries, and 
to cross-check the web-survey results on 
additionality. Only the projects of  2004 
were questioned11 to avoid comparing 
beneficiaries who applied under different 
regulations or in different economic en-
vironment. However, since many of  the 
surveyed companies have applied for or 
received business support grants also lat-
er on, their answers could to some extent 
represent mixture of  experiences from 
the analysed and later period.
The web survey was carried out among 
all applicants whose project either re-
ceived or not support in 2004. Overview 
of  respondents is given in Table 3. In 
addition, for each measure 15-30 inter-
views with beneficiaries (in some cases 
also with unsuccessful applicants) and 
~10 interviews with training companies, 
consultants, research institutions and lo-
cal governments were conducted. Initial 
plan was to use the answers of  unsuc-
cessful applicants as a comparison group, 
but in case of  training, consultancy, R&D 
and export plan programs the response 
rate was so low that survey answers could 
only be used as supplementary infor-
mation sources. Even by telephone re-
cruitment we were not able to raise the 
response rate much, partly due to EE’s 
outdated database of  contacts and partly 
due to negative experiences the firms had 
had in their dealings with EE.
The survey and interviews focused on 
project results/impacts. Taking into ac-
count that many impacts are difficult to 
measure (too early for impacts to emerge 
or they are inherently declaratory, e.g. 
change in competitiveness) the question-
naires also dealt with companies’ internal 
processes of  project preparation, selec-
tion and implementation. EE’s project 
selection procedures, communication 
with firms during project implementa-
tion phase and the general satisfaction 
of  beneficiaries with EE were dealt only 
insofar it was important for analysing im-
pact evaluation questions.
In selecting the interviewees the follow-
ing factors were considered: answers to 
web survey concerning additionality, sec-
tor, location of  the beneficiary (county) 
and other factors connected with the 
specifics of  measures.
Table 3. Overview of web survey and interview participants amongst the beneficiaries of EE grants
Grant type Supported/ 
not supported applicants
Firms No contact 
data
Questionnaires 
sent
Responses Response 
rate
Interviews*
Start-up grant Supported 192 9% 174 93 48,4% 15
Not supported 320 18% 264 64 20,0% 10
Business infrastructure 
development grant
Supported 39 0% 39 29 74,4% 8+8
Not supported 128 0% 128 23 18,0%
Training grant Supported 242 0% 232 110 45,5% 15+8
Not supported 180 3% 148 8 4,4%
Consultancy grant Supported 184 5% 174 69 37,5% 15+9
Not supported 142 15% 121 6 4,2% 10
R&D grant (firms) Supported 33 0% 33 20 60,6% 15
Not supported 2 0% 2 1 50,0%
R&D grant (institutions) Supported 14 0% 14 9 64,3% 13
Export plan program Supported 73 0%  73 21 28,8% 15
 Not supported 101 0%  101 3 3,0% 2
TOTAL 1 663 8% 1 342 472 28,4% 143
Total (supported firms) 777 5% 739 351 45,2% 96
Source: PRAXIS, calculations of the authors.
* - Interviews with firms + other interviews.
11 In case of  R&D and export plan program 2001-2003 projects were questioned due to the different periods evaluated. 
All the ap-
plicants were 
questioned.
Response rate of 
the unsuccessful 
applicants was 
too low.
6KredEx’s guarantees
For guarantees the report covers the years 
2002-2004. The evaluation was based on 
the same principles as in the case of  EE’s 
support measures. Web survey was con-
ducted amongst all the beneficiaries of  
this time period. Overview of  response 
rates is given in Table 4. In addition ~15 
companies who had used the guarantees 
and 3-4 private sector firms offering guar-
antees were interviewed in case of  both 
guarantee types. 
We also interviewed interested parties in-
volved in managing of  or in the policy-
making process of  the EE and KredEx 
programs to evaluate the relevance and 
program management of  the support 
measures. 
2.3. Assessing net impact
Net impact or additionality is the im-
pact that would not have occurred with-
out the grant. Thus the reality is compared 
with “the case of  the lack of  grant”. In 
case of  the bottom-up approach the net 
impact of  measure is found from gross 
impact12 using the following formula:
Net impact = (gross impact – 
deadweight) x (1 – leakage) x (1 – 
displacement) x (1 – substitution) 
x supply multiplicators x income 
multiplicators 
Assessment of  net impact is based on the 
following methodology and assumptions:
• Deadweight – outcomes that would 
have occurred even without the 
grant. 
The analysis of  deadweight is based 
on the opinions of  beneficiaries about 
what would have happened had they 
not received the grant. Assessments 
are based on the following questions:
- Would you have implemented the 
project without the grant? 
- Did the grant change your invest-
ment plans (size/timing/content)?
Also, in case of  some measures as-
sessments of  unsuccessful applicants 
were used to get additional informa-
tion. For objectivity, assessments of  
interviewers not respondents were 
used. If  available, economic data of  
beneficiaries were compared with 
general trends in business sector.
• Leakage – outcomes obtained by 
beneficiaries outside the measure’s 
target region or group.
For most programs (training, consul-
tancy, export plan, R&D) leakage is 
not a problem since the target region 
is Estonia. Since for other programs 
the assessment of  leakage would be 
too complicated for this project, it was 
considered equal to zero. 
• Displacement – outcomes obtained 
at the expense of  other similar out-
comes in target region. Displacement 
could take place in factor or product 
markets.
Displacement was assessed based on 
firm’s sector and its share of  exports 
in turnover. 
• Substitution – outcomes obtained 
by the firm when it replaced an activ-
ity with another similar one to get the 
grant.13 
Table 4. Overview of web survey and interview participants amongst the beneficiaries of KredEx’s 
guarantees
Guarantee type Firms No contact data Questionnaires sent Responses Response rate Interviews*
Export guarantee 128 9% 116 18 14,1% 12 + 4
Loan and leasing guarantee 320 32% 219 46 14,4% 17 + 3
TOTAL 448 25% 335 64 14,3% 35
Source: KredEx database, PRAXIS, calculations of the authors.
* - Interviews with firms + other interviews.
12  Gross impact – overall change in beneficiary’s (economic) indicators that are used to evaluate the measure.
13  E.g. as a result of  the grant firm’s employee was replaced by previously jobless person, and hence a new job was not created.
Deadweight was 
assessed based 
on the opinions 
of the benefici-
aries.
7Substitution was not assessed in this 
evaluation project.
Thus we looked at deadweight and dis-
placement, but did not quantify those in-
dicators.14
2.4. Indicators
The evaluation of  the design and impact 
of  EE programs is based on compari-
son against goals and indicators given in 
the NDP. For guarantees, objectives 
and indicators from KredEx’s strategic 
documents were used. In case of  some 
programs a lot of  attention was paid to 
behavioural changes (which were not in-
cluded among the official indicators) and 
project results instead of  final impacts 
because measuring the quantitative im-
pacts was too complicated. 
3. Conclusions and 
recommendations
The conclusions and recommendations 
have been presented in the detailed re-
ports for each measure and summarised 
in Annex 4 of  this report. Hereinafter 
only the main conclusions and recom-
mendations applicable to more than one 
measure will be given.
3.1. Relevance
The current study did not analyse the 
gaps in the market; rationale and ob-
jectives of  the grants were rather taken 
as given. We examined if  the support 
measures were compatible with the ob-
jectives specified in national economic 
policy documents and whether these 
objectives were met. 
Unfortunately, rationales of  the instru-
ments were often vaguely specified in the 
policy documents; the objectives and in-
dicators changed yearly, target values of  
the indicators were not set, etc. These 
weaknesses made the evaluation exercise 
difficult. Unclear or missing descriptions 
of  the logic and expected outcomes of  
the support measures make it almost 
impossible for outsiders to assess the re-
sults and impacts as well as to generate 
open discussion on the topic. In order to 
overcome the problem we specified the 
rationales in the beginning of  the project 
while interviewing the relevant policy-
makers.
Finally, the conclusion was that the evalu-
ated grants were predominantly rele-
vant and compatible with the objec-
tives specified in national economic 
policy documents. As much as could be 
said based on the web survey, the meas-
ures also conformed to the needs of  the 
beneficiaries and to the market situation. 
An exception was the consultancy grant 
whose weak design caused unexpected 
outcomes – 2/3 of  the grants were used 
for preparing project proposals while the 
initial idea of  the program was to provide 
strategic counselling. It is recommended 
to differentiate these two types of  con-
sultations and focus more on the sub-
stantive counselling of  firms.
Still, improvement of  design could 
increase the effectiveness of  several 
instruments:
• As regards the training and con-
sultancy grant, intervention has 
been demand-oriented until now 
(i.e. support has been given directly to 
the firms that consume the service), 
whereas, at the same time, the supply 
side, i.e. the training and consultancy 
market, also needs developing both in 
terms of  market structures (like the 
existence and availability of  quality-re-
lated information), and the range and 
quality of  the services offered E.g. 
if  to broaden the range of  available 
training courses it could be possible 
to commission training in impor-
tant topics currently not offered by 
training providers in Estonia and/
or to invite foreign training provid-
ers to render the service.
14 Quantified measurements for some grants are given for example in PRAXIS Working Paper 31/2007: Merit Tatar, Kadri Kuusk. Riikliku 
Arengukava 2004-2006 mõjuindikaatorite saavutusmäärade väljaselgitamine ja analüüs (includes a summary in English).
Rationales of 
the instruments 
were vaguely 
specified.
Grants were 
predominantly 
relevant.
Training and 
consultancy 
grant focused 
only on demand 
side.
8• In the case of  some programs, the 
target groups should be more 
specified (in case of  R&D support 
different type of  companies15 should 
be approached differently starting al-
ready from the evaluation of  project 
applications) or broadened (the ex-
port plan program should not be ori-
ented only towards enterprises already 
experienced in exporting). 
• Impact indicators need better iden-
tification. The currently used job-
centred indicators fail to encompass 
the whole impact of  the grants and 
also some of  the objectives set by the 
NDP (e.g. an increase in competitive-
ness). This could result in the rejection 
of  “good” projects and failure to reach 
the target levels of  the indicators estab-
lished. For example, most beneficiaries 
do not consider the main result of  train-
ing or consultation to be the creation 
of  new jobs, but instead, “softer” proc-
esses and longer-term impacts within 
the firm. Therefore, it is advised that in 
the future more consideration should 
be given to qualitative indicators and 
indicators targeted at the measure-
ment of  productivity. We also suggest 
that more of  the so-called interim indi-
cators be used which make it possible 
to observe, at the outset, whether the 
operation of  the program meets expec-
tations and whether the presumed re-
sults could be attained in the future.
• Additionality should be kept in mind 
already in the assessment phase of  the 
project applicatios.
3.2. Efficiency
The usage rate of  support money is 
good – as of  the end of  2006 for the six 
measures applications had been granted 
to the extent of  ~90% and payments had 
been made to the extent of  above 1/3 of  
the budget.16 But in terms of  efficiency 
there were also some shortcomings:
• First, in case of  several grants ap-
plication process and subsequent 
reporting have been very costly 
to enterprises.17 Furthermore, the 
processing of  smaller-scale projects 
with the same administrative bur-
den as large-scale projects makes the 
processing of  the former inevitably 
more expensive in relative terms. In 
case of  training grant this could, for 
example, be improved by increasing 
the share of  centrally financed stand-
ardised training courses and by intro-
ducing the accreditation of  training 
providers or training courses. In the 
case of  the infrastructure grant (and 
other large-scale grants) with its high 
demand, and the expensive reviewing 
and preparation of  bulky applications, 
resources could be better managed 
both for EE and firms by introduc-
ing a two-stage application process. 
In the first round of  short “business 
project” descriptions (1-2 pages), i.e. 
in the round of  preliminary proposals 
the potentially eligible projects would 
be selected and these applicants would 
be invited to draft comprehensive ap-
plications.
• Secondly, it appeared in the course 
of  evaluation that regular over-
views or electronic databases 
were missing for many impor-
tant indicators (e.g. the fields of  
training and consulting, application 
grades, etc.). It is advisable to im-
prove the monitoring system to en-
sure that data necessary for making 
management decisions is collected 
and to gear the system more to sup-
porting the management and analy-
sis of  measures (rather than only for 
financial reporting). The objective 
should be for the heads of  program 
to always have an overview of  what 
is happening within the scope of  the 
program and be able to provide in-
put for example for the evaluation 
committee and policymakers.
15 Different type of  firms include for example: starting high-tech companies, large companies engaged in R&D activities on a regular basis, as well as 
firms operating in traditional sectors which have not carried out R&D activities earlier.
16 National Development Plan Monitoring Report 2006. Ministry of  Finance, 2007. 
17 For further information please see: Survey of  Administrative Burden. Ministry of  Economic Affairs and Communications, 2007.
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9• On some occasions the efficiency has 
been hindered by sudden depletion 
of  funds or frequent modification 
of  program conditions. These have 
also damaged the reputation of  EE 
as a reliable partner. In the future, 
more attention should be paid to fi-
nancial management and to the pos-
sibility of  reallocating funds between 
various measures. And although prob-
lems in implementation, firms’ chang-
ing needs and altering market situa-
tion may sometimes necessitate the 
modification of  program rules these 
should be early on communicated to 
stakeholders.
3.3. Effectiveness
In terms of  overall impacts start-up 
grant was the most and export plan pro-
gram the least successful. Additionality 
varies greatly across the EE support 
measures depending both on the type 
of  support, the co-financing terms and 
the risk level of  the projects. The net im-
pact was the smallest in case of  low-risk 
infrastructure projects and the greatest in 
case of  start-up and training grants (see 
Figure 1)18. Answers referring to the great 
net impact of  low-risk training projects 
can largely be explained by the low self-
financing rate. On the other hand, the net 
impact of  R&D projects which typically 
have a high risk level is better charac-
terised by the large share of  those who 
would “probably” carry out the projects 
even without the support and, if  they do 
so, at remarkably lower cost. 
The additionality is high in the case 
of  both guarantees. Upon absence of  
 KredEx’s export guarantee companies 
would not have been able to secure their 
transactions elsewhere. Although most 
of  the transactions would have been con-
cluded without a guarantee, their volume 
would have been smaller and the terms 
of  payment would have been worse for 
the buyer. Upon the absence of  a loan 
18 The evaluation of  the net impact is based first of  all on the relative share of  those who would certainly have given up carrying out the project if  the 
application for support was rejected.
Figure 1. Approximate assessment of the deadweight of the projects*
Source: Web survey, PRAXIS 2008.
* - In case of the export plan program, one important intended outcome of the grant was the impact on the contents and structure of activities. 
Therefore, the question concerning the implementation of the project does not exactly measure additionality. For a more precise evaluation, please 
refer to the evaluation report of export plan program.
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Export plan
Infrastructure 
grant
R&D grant 
(firms)
45 17
 Yes, certainly    Maybe    No
100%0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Consultancy 
grant
Start-up grant
Training grant
R&D grant  
(institutions) 8 25 67
38 57 5
21 59 21
42 33 25
37 38 25
21 45 34
4
Infrastructure 
grant
Consultancy 
grant
Export plan
39 31
 Very unlikely    Unlikely   
 Likely    Very likely
100%0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Start-up grant
Training grant
R&D grant 
(firms)
4 28 44
45 30
6 41 35
7 44 32
4 52 22
26
24
25
18
17
22
In terms of 
overall impacts 
start-up grant 
was the most 
and export plan 
program the 
least successful.
Some measures 
have high addi-
tionality, others 
do not.
Would you have implemented  
the project without the grant?
How likely you would have implemented  
the project in the same amount?
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guarantee most of  the projects would not 
have been implemented. 48% of  the re-
spondents thought that they would not 
have been given a loan and quite a large 
portion of  the respondents (41%) was 
not certain of  their possibilities of  get-
ting a loan.
Some of  the reasons behind modest re-
sults in terms of  effectiveness:
• It is recommended that the pref-
erences established in the NDP 
should be better adhered to or 
additional (more specific) prefer-
ences should be established for 
the allocation of  support as this 
would contribute to the attainment 
of  the objectives of  the program and 
increase its net impact. For example, 
in case of  consultancy grant consul-
tations about the enterprises’ strate-
gic decisions should be preferred to 
consultations about the preparation 
of  project proposals. 
• As regards training grant, it would be 
advisable to limit the eligible train-
ing fields aimed at different target 
groups, as at present large enterprises 
use the majority of  the support for 
general management training which 
they should be able to finance them-
selves and the net impact of  which is 
low. Also, in the allocation of  support 
the priorities established in the NDP 
should be followed – e.g. innovation, 
production management, marketing 
training, etc., should be preferred to 
accounting training. Even though 
projects of  prioritised areas already 
get “bonus points” in the assessment 
of  applications, this has not resulted 
in greater funding for these areas. As 
the demand for the support has not 
lead to the desired outcome, it is rec-
ommended to focus on the supply 
side (where the absence of  appropri-
ate training courses is the problem) or 
increase the relative financial attrac-
tiveness of  the training courses for 
enterprises (where the low demand 
for such training is the problem).
• As the net impact varies depending 
on the project type and/or dura-
tion, it is advisable for some grants 
to additionally vary the co-financing 
rate accordingly.19 For example, one 
could lower the co-financing rate for 
training grant after certain amount of  
support is exceeded, since one goal 
of  the grant is to advertise the useful-
ness of  training for enterprises. Also, 
it could be possible to consider lower-
ing the co-financing rate of  the export 
plan expenses in the later stages of  the 
project, as with the development of  
the project the export risks decrease.
• In the case of  long-term projects 
(1-3 years) the terms and condi-
tions of  programs for training, ex-
port planning and R&D support were 
too rigid and not in conformity with 
the planning processes of  enterprises 
themselves. Entrepreneurs often had 
to plan their activities in too detailed 
a way for one or two years ahead (e.g. 
knowing in advance the names of  
lecturers, training times, precise list 
of  fairs, etc.) and when obstacles or 
changes occurred, it was not possible 
to choose more expedient activities or 
change the action plans based on new 
knowledge. As a result, projects pro-
duced modest impact (e.g. activities 
were not carried out at all or it was im-
possible to receive the support for the 
activities which in essence would have 
been eligible). It is recommended that 
the terms and conditions of  pro-
grams be adapted to the require-
ments of  long-term projects, us-
ing a stage-based approach – each 
project would be divided into stages 
and the financing and activities of  the 
next stage (year, 6 months, etc.) would 
be agreed upon at the end of  the pre-
vious stage.20 
19 The rate of  co-financing varies at present in case of  infrastructure grant depending on the location of  projects and in case of  training support depend-
ing on the type of  training and the size of  the enterprise. For the rest of  the grants, the co-financing rate is usually 50%. 
20 Such a system is partly already applied to R&D support.
Grant condi-
tions are too 
rigid for long-
term projects.
More attention 
could be paid to 
cross-usage of 
the measures.
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• The cross-usage21 of  different types 
of  support is modest (see Table 5). 
Less than 15% of  the firms which re-
ceived support in 2004 and 2005 have 
used more than one type of  grant, and 
most of  the firms that received con-
sultation grant as the second support 
type probably used it for the prepa-
ration of  the project proposal. Even 
though the cross-usage of  grants had 
not been defined as a goal on its own 
in the given period, it is recommended 
that more attention be paid to its po-
tential in the future. The interviews 
confirmed the positive influence of  
complementary grants on the achieve-
ment of  expected project results. For 
example, the export planning support 
contributed remarkably to the realisa-
tion of  the results of  R&D projects 
which, because of  marketing prob-
lems, would otherwise have remained 
unapplied or their application would 
have been postponed into the future. 
- The cross-usage could be increased 
by improving the awareness of  po-
tential and existing beneficiaries of  
the grants offered. The evaluation 
indicated that awareness is low at 
present.22 In the web survey many 
said that the reason for not using 
other types of  support was lack of  
information. Also the wish to re-
ceive a monthly newsletter about 
various grants was mentioned in the 
interviews on several occasions. 
- In addition, more attention needs 
to be paid to mentorship, enter-
prise diagnostics and the mainte-
nance of  active contacts between 
EE and entrepreneurs.
- One possibility to use support more 
Table 5. Overview of the cross-usage of EE grants in 2004-2005 (number of firms)
Grant type Supported/not 
supported firms
Start-up 
grant
Consultancy 
grant*
Training 
grant
Infrastructure 
grant
R&D grant Export plan 
program
Only 1 
grant**
Only 1 
grant %
Start-up 
grant
346/400 Supported 72 11 1 1 1 264 76,3%
Not 8 1 4 0 1
Consultancy 
grant
543/143 Supported 72 59 37 18 25 370 68,1%
Not 45 9 26 3 7
Training 
grant
660/241 Supported 11 59 25 10 37 553 83,8%
Not 5 12 15 1 6
Infrastructure 
grant
101/142 Supported 1 37 25 5 16 44 43,6%
Not 0 2 1 0 2
R&D grant 74/18 Supported 1 18 10 5 5 46 62,2%
Not 0 3 0 0 1
Export plan 
program
110/54 Supported 1 25 37 16 5 53 48,2%
Not 0 6 1 5 1
Guarantees Received 
EE grants
%
Export  
guarantees
128/na 9 9 22 9 1 11 32 25,0%
Leasing/loan 
guarantees 
320/na 10 19 20 5 3 8 52 16,3%
Source: Enterprise Estonia, KredEx, calculations of the authors. 
Explanations: The table should be read row by row. For example, the row “Start-up grant” sets out information about the companies that have 
received start-up grant, indicating their eagerness and success in applying for other types of support. For example, the uppermost number “72” in 
the column “Consultancy grant” indicates that 72 of the companies that had received start-up grant also received consultancy grant; the second 
number “8” in that column indicates that 8 of the companies that had received start-up grant also applied for consultancy grant, but were not 
successful.
The bottom part of the table covers KredEx’s guarantees. Most column headings are the same; differences are given in the table.
na - not available.
* - As regards consultancy grant it must be borne in mind that many companies used that support just for the preparation of applications for other 
types of grants.
** - Number of firms that used only one type of grant. The table does not include the support used by firms if the firm was not the direct applicant 
(e.g. training courses organised for start-ups centrally by EE). 
21 Cross-usage means the use of  several different grants by an enterprise for different projects or for different activities within the scope of  one large-scale 
project.
22 Surveys were conducted from October 2006 to January 2007. 21  The loan guarantee offered by KredEx could also in some cases be suitable for 
that.
Closer contacts 
between EE and 
entrepreneurs 
are advisable.
Introduce 
“growth pack-
age” aimed at 
most successful 
firms. 
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effectively is to shift from support-
based approach to an approach 
which is based on the type of  
firm (e.g. exporter, high-growth 
firm, R&D firm, life-style entrepre-
neur etc.). As the expected influ-
ence of  support and the needs of  
the beneficiaries differ across target 
groups, it would be more expedi-
ent for EE to use more resources 
for dealing with projects that would 
potentially have a greater impact or 
that would be carried out in the pri-
oritised fields of  activity, and to do 
so starting already in the phase of  
application assessment. 
• At present there are no instruments 
(except export plan) to further sup-
port the beneficiaries of  start-up 
grant who have reached the growth 
phase or to specially support firms 
with high growth potential.23 Af-
ter the start-up phase a firm usually 
reaches the situation where additional 
investments are needed to enter the 
phase of  fast growth. Without invest-
ments the firm’s development may 
reach a standstill. A solution could be 
a second stage of  support targeted at 
the most successful firms to encour-
age them to grow, so-called “growth 
package” prepared in accordance 
with the needs of  the firm, covering 
both operating costs and investments 
(e.g. consultation, training, product 
development, equipment, export plan-
ning, loan guarantee premium, project 
management costs, etc.).
• The regional division of  support is 
compatible with the regional divi-
sion of  firms.
3.4. Spillovers and sustainability 
In the long run, spillovers and behavioural 
additionality are often even more impor-
tant than immediate results and impacts. 
The study revealed changes in the be-
haviour of  enterprises and many posi-
tive spillovers although sustainability and 
spillovers varied across measures: 
• One of  the objectives of  training and 
consultancy grant was to influence the 
behaviour of  entrepreneurs and their 
attitude towards training/external con-
sultation. At present it seems that the 
behavioural influence has not yet 
been achieved, but one can observe 
a certain shift in attitude. For exam-
ple, some entrepreneurs overcame the 
reluctance to use external advice and, 
in ideal cases, longer term relationships 
were developed with the consultants. 
However, the long-term impact of  
consultancy grant used for the prepa-
ration of  applications on the entrepre-
neurs’ knowledge or behaviour in using 
consultations is questionable.
• The sustainability of  the export plan 
program was inhibited by many unfin-
ished projects and by the poor quality 
of  many export plans (the plans were 
unrealistic, activities were inadequately 
planned, inappropriate markets were 
chosen, etc.). Program still had a long-
term positive impact, as many entre-
preneurs obtained information about 
the value and usefulness of  different 
marketing activities for their company. 
• The positive long-term influence on 
the behaviour of  entrepreneurs could 
be observed in the case of  the support 
for R&D activities – managerial skills 
improved, relations with old partners 
were enhanced and new partners were 
found, new project ideas were gener-
ated and many firms/agencies have 
later carried out new projects and 
were now more successful in doing so 
probably due to previous experience 
and the newly obtained knowledge. 
• A longer-term positive effect is vis-
ible also in case of  export guarantees. 
Transactions guaranteed by KredEx 
were aimed at new markets or new 
business partners. The companies 
have remained active on these markets 
to date and most of  them also have 
the very same partners with whom 
they continue doing business without 
a guarantee. 
23 The loan guarantee offered by KredEx could also in some cases be suitable for that.
The study 
revealed many 
positive spillo-
vers.
Training and 
consultancy 
grants led to 
shift in atti-
tudes.
Support for 
R&D acttivi-
ties and export 
guarantee 
changed behav-
iour of enterpre-
neurs.
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ANNEX 1.
Overview of EE’s business support measures in 2004-200524
Table 7. Distribution of supported firms by sector in 2004-2005 (number) 
Sector Firms Share # of firms 
in Estonia
Share*
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 14 0,7% 10 229
Manufacturing 671 31,3% 5 991 18,6%
manufacture of food products and beverages 68 3,2%
manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 76 3,5%
tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of leather products 2 0,1%
manufacture of wood and wood products 195 9,1%
manufacture of pulp, manufacture of paper and paper products; publishing 7 0,3%
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 26 1,2%
manufacture of rubber and plastic products 27 1,3%
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 31 1,4%
manufacture of metals and fabricated metal products 121 5,6%
manufacture of other machinery and equipment 34 1,6%
manufacture of electrical machinery and optical instruments 42 2,0%
manufacture of transport equipment 23 1,1%
other manufacturing (incl. furniture) 272 12,6%
Electricity, gas and water supply 21 1,0% 282 0,9%
Construction 177 8,3% 3 622 11,3%
Wholesale and retail trade 83 3,9% 17 928
Hotels and restaurants 209 9,7% 1 990 6,2%
Transport, storage and communication 88 4,1% 6 006 18,7%
Financial intermediation 12 0,6% 563
Real estate, renting and business activities 125 5,8% 11 201 34,8%
Education, health and social work 110 5,1% 1 471 4,6%
Other community, social and personal service activities 382 17,8% 1 599 5,0%
TOTAL 2 145 100% 60 882 100%
Unknown 88 4,1%
Source: Enterprise Estonia, Statistics Estonia, calculations of the authors. 
* - excluding sectors which are in general not eligible for support (primary sector, wholesale and retail trade, financial intermediation).
Table 6. Distribution of projects by firm size in 2004-2005 (number)
Firm size Projects Share
Micro 905 46,8%
Small 520 26,9%
Medium 414 21,4%
Big 74 3,8%
Unknown 22 1,1%
TOTAL 1 935 100%
Source: Enterprise Estonia, calculations of the authors.
24  Includes only support measures co-financed by the EU structural funds and covered by the report.
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ANNEX 2.
Overview of KredEx’s short-term export guarantees in 2002-2004
Table 8. Impact indicators in 2001-2006 (mil EEK, number)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Guaranteed export turnover 31 112 167 648 742 588
Share of Estonia’s total export 0,2% 0,87% 0,81% 0,49%
Firms using guarantees 14 20 56 96 77 65
Export partner countries exported to 13 20 25 29 27 35
Guaranteed buyers 50 52 155 398 395 203
Guaranteed credit limit 53 42 130 326 352 186
Source: KredEx database, Bank of Estonia, calculations of the authors.
Table 9. Guaranteed export by export region in 2003-2006 (mil EEK)
2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % Total %
Western Europe 96,99 58,1% 511,73 79,8% 577,87 79,4% 328,56 55,9% 1515,15 71,4%
Central and Eastern Europe 47,50 28,5% 97,36 15,2% 93,13 12,8% 146,97 25,0% 384,96 18,1%
Russia/CIS 6,24 3,7% 4,97 0,8% 8,23 1,1% 28,03 4,8% 47,47 2,2%
Other developed countries 14,81 8,9% 26,82 4,2% 47,86 6,6% 84,20 14,3% 173,69 8,2%
Developing countries 1,30 0,8% 0,19 0,0% 0,36 0,1% 0,23 0,0% 2,08 0,1%
TOTAL 166,84 100% 641,06 100% 727,45 100% 587,99 100% 2123,34 100%
Source: KredEx database.
Table 10. Distribution of guaranteed firms by size in 2002-2004 (number)
Firm size Firms Share Share of exporters 
in Estonia
Micro 26 24,3% 27%
Small 39 36,7% 44%
Medium 29 26,7%
Big 13 12,2% 29%
Unknown 32
Source: KredEx database, Commercial Register, The survey of Estonian exporters in 2004, calculations of the authors.
Notes: Firm size is based on the number of employees. Number of firms is the unweighted average of the firms of respective size 
group in 2001-2005. As the distribution by medium-sized and big firms was lacking in the survey of Estonia’s exporters only 
aggregate number is given for the share of these two size groups. 
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Table 11. Distribution of guaranteed firms by sector in 2002-2004 (number)
Sector Firms Share
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining 0 0%
Manufacturing 91 74,6%
manufacture of food products and beverages 9 7,4%
manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 12 9,8%
tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of leather products 1 0,8%
manufacture of wood and wood products 20 16,4%
manufacture of pulp, manufacture of paper and paper products; publishing 6 4,9%
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4 3,3%
manufacture of rubber and plastic products 2 1,6%
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 4 3,3%
manufacture of metals and fabricated metal products 7 5,7%
manufacture of other machinery and equipment 3 2,5%
manufacture of electrical machinery and optical instruments 2 1,6%
manufacture of transport equipment 1 0,8%
other manufacturing (incl. furniture) 20 16,4%
Electricity, gas and water supply 0 0,0%
Construction 0 0,0%
Wholesale and retail trade, repair 29 23,8%
Transport, storage and communication 0 0,0%
Services, incl. hotels, restaurants, business activities, finance 2 1,6%
Education, health and social work etc. 0 0,0%
TOTAL 122 100%
Unknown 6 4,9%
Source: KredEx database, Commercial Register, calculations of the authors.
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ANNEX 3.
Overview of KredEx’s investment loan and leasing guarantees in 
2002-2004
Tabel 12. Distribution of clients by sector in 2002-2004 (number)
Sector Loan Leasing Total Share 
Manufacturing 122 32 154 43%
manufacture of food products and beverages 26 10 36 10%
manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 13 1 14 4%
manufacture of wood and wood products 37 4 41 12%
manufacture of pulp, manufacture of paper and paper products; publishing 2 6 8 2%
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4 1 5 1%
manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4 1 5 1%
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2 0 2 1%
manufacture of metals and fabricated metal products 14 5 19 5%
manufacture of other machinery and equipment 2 1 3 1%
manufacture of electrical machinery and optical instruments 2 0 2 1%
manufacture of transport equipment 1 0 1 0%
other manufacturing (incl. furniture) 15 3 18 5%
Electricity, gas and water supply 9 0 9 3%
Construction 6 3 9 3%
Wholesale and retail trade 54 9 63 18%
Hotels and restaurants 39 3 42 12%
Transport, storage and communication 11 1 12 3%
Real estate, renting and business activities 9 2 11 3%
Health and social work 13 0 13 4%
Other community, social and personal service activities 29 4 33 9%
Education 3 0 3 1%
Unknown 4 0 4 1%
TOTAL 299 54 353 100%
Source: KredEx database, calculations of the authors.
Note: Distribution is given by the number of contracts.
Figure 2. Distribution of clients by firm size in 2002-2004 (%)
Source: KredEx database, calculations of the authors.
Note: For 26 guaranteed firms (7%) there is no data on the size in KredEx database. 
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A. Start-up grant
The overall goal of  start-up grant is to 
“... stimulate the emergence of  new en-
terprises” and the specific objective is 
to “increase the possibilities of  crea-
tion, survival and development of  SMEs 
through improving access to financing.”
ANNEX 4.
• Although over the last three years the availability of  finances as a 
bottleneck in the development of  SMEs has decreased, the existence 
of  grant can still be considered relevant in this regard.
• The existence of  the counselling component is highly relevant.
• At the same time consultancy grant’s content and its real 
benefits to the company’s economic activities are insufficient, 
as a result of  which the efficiency of  the start-up grant will probably 
be potentially lower.
• The beneficiaries considered supporting the acquisition of  
equipment fully justified and necessary for their project.
• The application appraisal criteria foster selection of  entrepreneurs 
with high success potential.
• The principles of  differentiating between the grant of  50,000 
(called start-up support) and 160,000 kroons (growth support) need 
a more detailed analysis, given that the share of  the latter exceeds 
2/3 of  the volume of  support.
Future opportunities:
• Improving the counselling service.
• To create possibilities for more intense support of  enterprises 
which prove rapid growth, incl. access to additional investment 
funds.
• CDCs25 should take a more active role in stimulating establishment 
of  new enterprises in counties where the overall enterprise birth rate 
and the use of  the start-up grant is lower than on average.
• It is possible to use loan guarantees more actively in supporting 
start-ups.
• The number of  beneficiaries (150-200 a year) is modest, but 
according to a very approximate assessment ~15% of  the start-ups 
receive start-up grant.26
• The share of  beneficiaries who have high growth potential 
and represent the knowledge sector is lower than expected.
• The high share of  beneficiaries in rural areas is positive.
• Although on the whole the regional division of  support is fully 
satisfactory, the higher activeness of  some areas is evident (e.g. Ida-
Viru, Saare).
• Training and consultancy grant is used relatively modestly once the 
start-up grant has been received.
• Financial leverage is good, because the actual co-financing rate is 
usually lower than the established limit of  75% (the annual average 
was 65% in 2004 and 57.8% in 2005).27
Relevance / 
Design
Efficiency
25 County Development Agency
26 Estonian Statistical Office. The author’s calculations.
27 The database of  Enterprise Estonia. The author’s calculations.
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• If  EE or the partners involved in implementation of  the programs 
lose contact with the final recipients, the possibility to influence 
their further development and activities is very small. EE should 
consider turning the so-called control visits conducted in the course 
of  present ex-post assessments into substantive counselling visits, 
which contribute to the development of  the company. The present 
visit, which is confined to simple questioning, is not efficient use of  
the EE’s funds.
• The reputation of  the grant suffered a blow when the funds were 
exhausted in the middle of  the fiscal year.
Future opportunities:
• One could involve the advisors, CDCs and incubation centres (who 
are involved in the process of  drawing up a business plan) later on 
as a mentor/supervisor/monitor instead of  EE, especially in the 
case of  firms with growth potential.
• It is possible to raise the awareness of  potential entrepreneurs 
and increase grant applications in regions where the number 
of  applications is low. If  the success in some regions is due to 
the active work with and the counselling of  potential applicants, 
it would be possible to increase the efficiency by improving these 
activities in under-represented regions.
• A high survival rate of  start-ups (89% 2 years after commencement 
of  the project).
• A high share of  start-ups in manufacturing.
• 182 enterprises supported in 2004 employed 556 paid employees 
in 2006.
• However, it should be noted that many enterprises did not 
achieved the turnover forecasts of  the year following the 
receiving of  the grant.
• Grant has been an important source of  start-up capital and 
upon absence thereof  many would have been forced to finance the 
project with a loan.
• Deadweight is medium. At the same time, without the grant most 
of  the entrepreneurs would have implemented their projects on a 
smaller scale and over a far longer period. Thus, the additionality in 
terms of  volume and time reduces the initial deadweight estimate 
considerably.
• It is positive that 88.4% of  the web survey respondents noted 
that they drew up the business plan themselves or in cooperation 
with a consultant and over 50% found that the drawing-up of  the 
business plan was “very helpful” or “helpful” in managing the 
company afterwards. At the same time the interviews indicated that 
in reality the business plan was not used later (some had used it 
either upon applying for a new grant or bank loan) and had not 
made any changes to the business plan later.
• It was mentioned that the impact of  involving a consultant did 
involve getting a clearer picture of  the plans of  the company, but 
their main role was nevertheless adjustment of  the business plan to 
the needs of  EE.
• The feedback to the beneficiaries after the end of  the project 
has been insufficient. Only 21% of  the web survey respondents 
said that they have received such feedback. In general the role 
Effectiveness
19
of  EE/CDCs was confined to counselling upon drawing up the 
application and compiling later reports. There was no substantive 
assistance to the companies (incl. diagnostics).
• The mentorship program has been welcomed by entrepreneurs.
• The low awareness of  entrepreneurs of  the support possibilities and 
their desire to receive new information about the activities of  EE.
Future opportunities:
• More attention should be paid to monitoring and mentorship of  
recipients of  start-up grant, incl. establishment and maintenance 
of  relations between the mentor and the entrepreneur.
• Increasing awareness of  the possibilities of  start-up support 
(incl. training and counselling).
• The present start-up grant does not encourage submission of  larger 
projects, because the grant has a maximum limit. If  the maximum 
limit were given up, a progressive co-financing rate could be 
considered (for instance, a reducing co-financing rate in the case of  
major projects).
• Business plans and counselling have been weak. Often the 
contact between the consultant and the entrepreneur is confined 
to the adjustment of  the business plan with the requirements of  
EE and the consultant does not have any interest in the substantive 
quality or realism of  the business plan.
• Entrepreneurs have used few external training/counselling 
services and support.
• It is very positive that over 30% of  the companies applied for 
a loan later and all received it. However, it should be noted that 
approximately 25% of  them had received a positive credit decision 
even before receiving the start-up grant.
Future opportunities:
• A possible solution could be the lengthening of  the contact 
between the consultant and the entrepreneur. The business 
plan consultant could act as the supervisor/instructor of  the 
company’s activities in the first year, being liable for, among 
other things, achievement of  the forecasts.
• At present there are no instruments for further support of  
recipients of  start-up grant who have entered the growth 
phase and for purposeful supporting of  firms with high 
growth potential.
Future opportunities:
• A solution could be two-stage grant in the framework of  which 
the most successful would be rewarded after the start-up phase, 
in order to encourage them to grow. The support of  the second 
stage could be a so-called growth package, which would cover 
the running as well as investment costs (counselling, training, 
product development, export plan, compensation of  loan guarantee 
premium, project management expenses, etc.). The package would 
be aimed only at the most successful ones and be compiled pursuant 
to the company’s needs.
Spillovers
Sustainability
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B. Training grant
The goal of  the training grant is to “sup-
port training and retraining of  entrepre-
neurs and employees, in order to main-
tain and increase the competitiveness of  
employees in the labour market, to devel-
op entrepreneurship, to create conditions 
for creation of  new jobs, and to increase 
people’s capacity in the field of  research 
and development and technology devel-
opment.”
• The cost of  training remains the biggest obstacle for many 
entrepreneurs in training employees. 24% of  managers have 
a business or management degree from a higher education 
institution.28 Thus, the program remains relevant for resolution 
of  these problems.
• The grant is aimed at all enterprises that comply with 
the conditions and there are no significant preferences in 
appraising applications in terms of  business sectors or fields of  
training. Although training relating to “introduction of  innovative 
and modern management methods or production technologies” are 
given bonus points in appraising application, this has not ensured a 
high share of  such training in using support.
• So far intervention has been that of  the demand side (firms 
using the service have been supported), while the supply side 
(training market) also needs to be developed in terms of  the 
market structures (in particular, the existence and availability of  
information on quality) as well as the selection and quality of  
services provided (there are problems in finding training in the 
areas of  production management and increasing effectiveness). If  
the supply side is not attended to, prices may start increasing in the 
conditions of  rising demand.
• Beneficiaries were mostly pleased with the program 
conditions. Field training and study visits were mentioned among 
the uncovered aspects.
Future opportunities:
• Accreditation of  training companies and/or some training 
courses could be considered as a tool for providing and 
intermediating information about the quality of  training providers.
• In addition to providing information to entrepreneurs, accreditation 
would allow for reduction of  the current high administrative 
burden (of  enterprises, training providers as well as EE) if  different 
application procedures and documentary requirements were applied 
with regard to training companies whose quality and reliability has 
been declared acceptable through accreditation.
• To increase the selection of  training offered it is possible to 
commission training in the requested topics which are 
currently not offered and/or invite foreign instructors.
• Since most of  the beneficiaries do not see creation of  new jobs, but 
“softer” processes taking place in the enterprise as the main results of  
training, the introduction of  more qualitative indicators and those 
aimed at measuring the productivity could be considered.
• EE could treat training providers more like key partners who 
work towards the same goal. At present, cooperation with training 
providers is modest.
Relevance / 
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• Ineffective use of  available funds by EE:
- Although by today organisation of  centrally funded training 
in the framework of  the training plan has been introduced, the 
share of  such simpler training which allows for standardisation 
could be higher in order to achieve economies of  scale.
- Many very small projects are financed. Also, many companies, 
including bigger ones, have submitted nearly 10 projects in 18 
months.
• Training providers and final recipients have not noticed a steep 
rise in prices in the training market.
• The requirement of  asking three price offers has resulted in 
numerous “empty” offers being made.
• The structure of  beneficiaries is not balanced. Some very large 
projects receive a large portion of  the support funds. Three most 
supported enterprises used over 20% of  EE support money in 
2004-2005.
Future opportunities:
• To increase the share of  training centrally funded by EE in the 
case of  simpler training which allows for standardisation.
• Consistent work for the purpose of  ensuring the functionality of  
the requirement of  three price offers. Raising the limit to 90,000 
kroons was a step in the right direction.
• The division of  support with regard to the objectives established 
by the NDP is out of  balance in terms of  the training areas. 
Most of  the training funds are spent on general management training 
and there is little related to marketing and software; in terms of  quality 
management the situation is satisfactory.
• EE supports merely the organisation of  training, although the 
stage following the training course (where the knowledge obtained 
must be disseminated and applied) is of  critical importance in terms 
of  the effectiveness of  the training. Often a project comes to a halt at 
this stage and results in a low use of  new knowledge.
• Regionally, the use of  grant is concentrated, but in line with the 
location of  Estonian enterprises – enterprises of  Harju County use 
half  of  the support and, jointly with Tartu County, 2/3 of  support. 
In terms of  the sectoral division the share of  manufacturing firms 
is above the Estonian average, but the distribution is similar in 
terms of  sub-sectors.
• The share of  micro enterprises is high. 10% of  the support 
money goes to large corporations.
• In the case of  2/3 of  projects the proposal for training was made 
by the management or by an employee who had undertaken 
training.
• Most of  the companies found that the training corresponded to 
their needs.
• Almost everyone who participated in training has applied the 
obtained knowledge at work.
• The share of  projects which would not have been implemented 
without grant is quite high. Also, upon absence of  grant the size of  
projects would have been considerably cut. Thus, the deadweight 
is medium.
• 39% of  the beneficiaries are engaged in export and export forms over 
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50% of  the turnover for 16% of  the beneficiaries.29 Thus, attention 
must be paid to displacement and it reduced the net impact of  grant.
• 20 out of  the 53 projects of  large corporations were aimed at 
general management knowledge.30
Future opportunities:
• Training in the priority fields of  the NDP should be favoured 
more.
• Since the expected impact of  the training grant and the needs 
of  beneficiaries differ by target groups, it is preferable to 
treat them differently in application procedures. The present 
uniform but complicated bureaucracy is too expensive for all 
parties and it results in a waste of  resources. SMEs and large 
corporations, larger and small projects should be applied 
different application requirements.
• Since usually the introductory standardised training courses are 
suitable for start-ups and SMEs, the activities financed in the 
framework of  the training plan should be continued and their 
share should be increased.
• Eligible fields of  training aimed at different target groups could 
be limited. For instance, at present, large corporations spend a large 
portion of  grant on general management training which they should 
be able to finance themselves and whose additionality is therefore low.
• Since one of  the goals of  the grant is to show to entrepreneurs the 
necessity and usefulness of  training, the net impact of  grant should 
decrease once the enterprise has used training more. Thus, the 
binding of  the co-financing rate with the number or volume of  
previously used training grants could be considered.
• The fostering of  the successfulness of  the post-training stage 
through amending the terms and conditions of  the training 
grant could be considered.
• The demand for training has increased, because according to 
training providers, firms that could not afford it previously have 
started using training.
• Prices have risen with regard to short-term training courses.
• The bureaucracy arising from the grant has affected the work of  
training firms (e.g. some of  them have hired an employee to attend 
specifically to training grant).
• It is positive that beneficiaries have made more training plans 
than on average in Estonia.
• The growth in demand has not yet resulted in positive feedback 
to the market – there is not yet a self-sustaining cycle where the 
demand results in the growth of  quality and better quality in higher 
demand. Thus, the training grant is not yet sustainable and the 
positive impact would be lost if  support will be terminated. At the 
same time a positive change in the attitudes of  entrepreneurs 
can be noticed, but the impact on the behaviour has not 
materialised yet.
Spillovers
Sustainability
29 Follow-up evaluation of  training support of  Enterprise Estonia in 2004. Enterprise Estonia, December 2006.
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C. Consultancy grant
The goal of  consultancy grant is to 
support the growth of  companies and 
creation of  new jobs, by providing the 
expertise required for business and 
helping the entrepreneurs to find new 
markets.
• The initial idea and rationale of  the program remain 
relevant.
• The subject of  a large number of  projects was the 
preparation of  applications for support from other programs. 
This contributed to the attainment of  program’s goals merely 
indirectly.
Future opportunities:
• The program should involve more active communication (e.g. 
articles with positive and negative examples, seminars, environments 
for exchanging experiences, etc.) of  the usefulness of  external 
consultations, the selection and use of  a consultant, etc., which 
would increase the interest in using external expert assessment (for 
other than writing financing applications).
• The use of  foreign consultants should be favoured more, 
because there is a lack of  specialists with area-specific knowledge 
in Estonia and in the case of  using foreign consultants the financial 
problems (and thus, the additionality) are greater.
• Application assessment criteria and performance indicators could 
be different in the case of  start-ups and already active enterprises, 
because the needs, expected results and the methods of  their 
achievement are different for these target groups. 
• The program has not been very efficient in terms of  attainment 
of  its main goals – in the case of  many financed projects it is 
contributed indirectly to the attainment of  the goals through other 
support programs (if  the application is successful).
• Entrepreneurs often did not engage in the selection of  a suitable 
consultant with sufficient thoroughness.
• The preparedness of  entrepreneurs to use external expertise 
(not related to a new financing application) is relatively low.
Future opportunities:
• To reduce support for preparation of  financing applications.
• The program should involve more active communication (see 
above).
• The problems of  finding a suitable consultant can be solved 
by activities aimed at increasing the quality of  consultants, 
dissemination of  information (quality standards, databases, etc.) 
and respective counselling (e.g. in the framework of  preliminary 
diagnostics). 
• The additionality of  the program is relatively low, i.e. many 
projects would have been implemented even without the support 
(in particular, projects preparing new project applications).
• The impact of  the program on the economic results of  the 
enterprises was relatively low, excl. start-ups.
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Future opportunities:
• To reduce support for preparation of  financing applications, 
because the additionality of  such support is low and positive 
spillovers are modest as well (see the next part).
• Respectively, to increase support for other consultations services, 
which are not related to preparation of  project applications. I.e. to 
increase the use of  professional experts (if  necessary foreign 
consultants) for which enterprises lack funds themselves.
• The program has contributed to the development of  the 
consultation market. The supply has increased. The program has 
had an impact on the quality and price of  the services rendered, but 
this needs a more thorough analysis.
• The program contributed to the rise of  the quality of  project 
applications and reduced barriers arising from a heavy administrative 
burden, which hamper the preparedness of  enterprises for applying 
for business support. Especially smaller enterprises have difficulties 
to keep up with all the requirements.
• Project compilation and management capacity of  supported 
projects improved.
• The use of  external experts by supported enterprises and the 
respective preparedness to use counselling have increased.
• The relationship between an entrepreneur and a consultant 
continues more often if  project’s goal was not the preparation of  a 
new financing application.
• Positive effects were the strongest if  foreign experts were 
used (new ideas, knowledge, contacts).
Future opportunities:
• By reducing the support for preparation of  financing applications 
the spillovers of  the program and the behavioural additionality will 
increase further.
• The use of  external expertise has increased. In the case of  larger 
projects new cooperation relationships emerged, which continued 
after the end of  the project.
Spillovers
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D. Business infrastructure development 
support
The goal of  the infrastructure grant is 
to “improve the business environment 
of  the existing companies by support-
ing the creation of  the required busi-
ness infrastructure and industrial real 
estate equipped with modern infra-
structure”.
• Since there is plenty of  infrastructure that is in poor condition and 
unsuitable for industry in Estonia, the program aimed at resolving 
this problem remains relevant. This is proven by surveys carried 
out among SMEs where 12-15% of  firms mentioned the lack of  
infrastructure or suitable working premises as an important obstacle 
to development both in 2002 as well as 2005.31, 32, 33
• In general, entrepreneurs are pleased with the design of  
the program; the main worry is the time spent on applying for 
support.
• The program is demand-based and there are no general/
uniform quality standards on the basis of  which to evaluate the 
need for/usefulness of  the projects from the point of  view of  the 
firm or state.
• Projects are enterprise-centred, not aimed at local 
development. The role of  the local authority is technical, being 
confined to preparation of  the required application documents and 
there is no substantive cooperation with companies regarding the 
projects.
Future opportunities:
• It would be good if  evaluators of  applications had instructions 
and principles as to the quality standards of  the industrial 
infrastructure desired by the state so that these can be followed 
in selecting the projects.
• In order to attain wider impact of  support the transfer of  the 
project selection mechanism to the regional level may be 
considered.
• The program is not large, covering only a small portion of  
potential beneficiaries.
• Demand has been high – approximately half  of  the project 
ideas are financed eventually. On the one hand the abundance of  
applications allows for selecting higher quality projects, on the 
other hand it means a relatively high program administration cost, 
because applications are very long and technical.
• The round-based approach is justified, because the rounds are 
the only moment when projects are compared with one another, 
they are put in an order of  priority and it is chosen which projects 
are to be financed and which are not.
• If  the grant is evaluated from a broader social perspective, 
the efficiency of  the program is negatively affected by weak 
cooperation with local authorities and other nearby 
enterprises.
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• As a rule, the financial status of  the beneficiaries would have allowed 
for implementation of  the project either by using corporate funds 
or a loan. Since most of  the firms did not have problems with the 
collateral, the “cost” of  such investment to the firm is interest 
expenses.
Future opportunities:
• Since it is expensive to analyse and prepare technical and 
voluminous applications, the application process should be 
divided into two stages to reduce the project document examination 
workload: at the first stage of  short descriptions of  “business” 
projects (1-2 pages) potentially suitable projects would be selected.
• Interest subsidies could be considered as an alternative 
support mechanism of  infrastructure investments.
• For the purpose of  more efficient use of  the Structural Funds one 
should consider making the enterprise-centred approach more 
focused on local development.
• The regional and sectoral division is satisfactory. Projects from 
nearly all counties have been financed and 2/3 of  projects are located 
in rural areas. At the same time several projects have been financed 
in the proximity of  large cities where their effectiveness may be 
lower. The high share of  the manufacturing and the representation 
of  various industries among beneficiaries are positive.
• The main effect of  the support lies in the growth of  the value 
of  the benefiting enterprise. Important impact from the point 
of  view of  the state (i.e. job creation and growth in turnover) 
become visible through larger investments involved (establishment 
of  production, expansion). Upon absence of  a “larger” project the 
connection with the production process and productivity is weak 
and therefore the direct impact on the turnover and jobs is also 
weak.
• The additionality is modest, because the project application 
appraisal criteria prefer a good financial position of  firms over 
the benefits arising for society, as a result of  which projects with 
a low risk level are supported and a large portion of  the projects 
could have been implemented without the grant. The high share of  
export in the turnover of  the supported enterprises and preferring 
projects with an innovative technology are positive.
• Not enough time (i.e. two years) has passed from the end of  the 
projects in order to measure impact indicators. As for jobs it 
can be noted that although creation of  jobs is indirectly connected 
to most projects, it is unlikely that the goals are attained, given the 
high deadweight. On the contrary, the overall growth of  turnover has 
been higher than the goal of  10%.34 But so has the growth of  firms 
in Estonian on the whole (~33% for industry in 2003-2005).35
• Since half  of  the enterprises which have been analysed more closely 
export over 50% of  their products the displacement effect of  the 
grant can be considered low and the structure of  beneficiaries 
can be considered positive from the point of  view of  the 
state.
34 Growth of  turnover through 2003-2005.
35 Database of  the Estonian Statistical Office.
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• The support speeded up the implementation of  projects (0.5 to 
1 years).
• In many cases successful growing enterprises receive the support 
and it determines the supported sectors (e.g. timber sector).
Future opportunities:
Since the broader impact of  the investments is virtually non-existence 
and projects are often implemented even if  no support is received, 
the raising of  the self-financing rate could be considered.
• Adding a broader local impact to the application appraisal 
criteria could be considered.
• Taking into account the additionality in the appraisal criteria 
could be considered.
• Since the infrastructure grant is very enterprise-centred, the 
broader impact of  the investments is modest. In the case of  
most projects there are no positive spillovers to other (current or 
future) enterprises and/or nearby industrial sites. 
• To a certain extent the program impacts also enterprises which have 
not received support. Considering that many enterprises noted the 
desire to use the infrastructure grant as a reason for making the 
investment at this point in time and that projects were implemented 
in spite of  not receiving support, the grant certainly speeded up 
the implementation of  their investment plans.36
• It is positive that nearly half  of  the projects have been either 
environmentally friendly or aimed directly at resolution of  
environmental problems. 
• If  an investment did not have a direct connection with or impact 
on the production processes of  the beneficiaries, the entrepreneurs 
mentioned softer and estimated changes such as improvement 
of  the workplace’s look as the essential impact of  the investment 
(owing to which they are no longer ashamed of  bringing over their 
foreign partners to take a look at the plant). 
• The main spillover channel in the case of  projects which would 
have been implemented anyways is activities which were carried 
out from the funds released due to receiving the grant. Thus, from 
the point of  society there can be broader impact only in the case 
of  supporting enterprises who are expanding their activities or 
planning a considerable rise in the productivity.
36 Excluding exceptions where the time spent on applying for support postponed the start of  the project.
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E. Research and development support
The goal of  the measure was to apply the 
developed technologies and innovations in 
business, thus increasing the effectiveness and 
improving the performance indicators of  the 
company implementing the project and the 
Estonian business sector on the whole.
• The program corresponds to the objectives set out in policy 
documents, i.e. contributes to the implementation of  innovations 
in business and thus to the improvement of  the competitiveness of  
the supported companies.
• The impact of  the program on the performance of  enterprises 
remains more modest than expected (and forecasted by enterprises).
• The program remains relevant, because corporate R&D 
investments are lower than desirable and the ties between the 
research and business sectors are weak.
Proposals for improvement of  the program design, which might 
contribute to attainment of  a stronger impact:
• Expansion of  the supported activities could be considered (e.g. 
the new idea of  supporting mobility is a step towards this end), 
because problems often arose at the stages following development.
• Very different firms are supported (e.g. high-tech start-ups vs. 
enterprises operating in traditional industries that have not engaged 
in development before) and to a certain extent their differences 
should be taken into account upon implementation of  the 
measure (different assessment criteria, flexibility of  the program, 
counselling).
• Besides impact indicators more attention should be paid to 
behavioural additionality – to evaluate changes in the R&D 
activities and capacity of  enterprises (e.g. innovation audits). 
• Projects of  the key areas set out in the R&D strategy (information 
and communication technology, biotechnology, material technology) 
and energy and environmental technology projects dominated 
among the supported projects.
• The efficiency was reduced by a heavy administrative burden, 
the relatively small flexibility of  the measure (changing plans is 
time-consuming) and little transparency (according to those who 
received support).
• Information on the expected results and impact of  the project was 
gathered from companies on the basis of  different indicators and 
inconsistently.
• Preliminary surveys provided important information about the 
feasibility of  the project and the possibility of  using the results thereof.
Future opportunities:
• In the case of  high-risk projects the program should be more 
flexible (e.g. to ease and speed up the process of  amendment and 
clarification of  plans).
• The monitoring system could be modified (to gather information con-
sistently, e.g. about project technology areas, enter assessments on the 
additionality of  the project from the application). Evaluation of  per-
formance of  the established impact indicators also calls for similar and 
ongoing gathering of  the respective information from the enterprise.
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• The administrative burden should be reduced (to demand, 
for instance, the conduct of  an audit instead of  submitting all the 
expense receipts in several copies).
• A method of  receipt of  applications that would prevent the occurrence 
of  long pauses in the receipt of  applications should be used. 
• The additionality of  the program is high in comparison with 
other business support measures, but not on the basis of  
international comparison. Thus, more should be aimed for in 
the next period.
• Nearly half  of  the projects were financially unsuccessful. 
Thus, they did not have a direct positive impact on the corporate 
performance indicators, but they did have an indirect impact (see the 
Spillovers). Problems arose mostly at stages following development 
(attainment of  the production capacity, marketing).
Future opportunities:
• To pay more attention to additionality at the stage of  application 
assessment (are we supporting projects that would be implemented 
even without grant?).
• In the case of  major projects the so-called project supervisor 
or mentor could be used. Their role would be to communicate 
with the entrepreneur, raise issues concerning attainment of  results 
and help to find solutions to the problems.
• The management skills of  such projects, technological 
knowledge and competencies which allow for launching new 
and more successful projects increased.
• New development ideas were generated and new projects were 
initiated on the basis thereof. For firms with no prior development 
experience the behavioural additionality was especially high. 
• Equipment and infrastructure required for further development 
work was acquired.
• Relations with the existing partners were strengthened and/or 
new partners were found. Cooperation with these partners has 
continued, sparking new development ideas.
• Cooperation of  R&D institutions with companies influenced 
the priorities of  their further research – more attention is paid 
to cooperation projects with companies.
• In the case of  R&D institutions the quality of  publications rose 
and it became easier to publish them in science magazines. 
Future opportunities:
• The use of  competent project supervisors might increase the 
behavioural additionality further (e.g. bring them together with 
potential partners and consultants, etc.).
• The behavioural additionality would also be increased by binding the 
financial support for knowledge transfer (e.g. through planned 
program of  enhancing mobility and recruitment of  top specialists).
• In particular, new knowledge and skills (behavioural additionality) have 
a long-term impact and refer to the sustainability of  the program.
Effectiveness
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F. Export plan support
The goal of  the export plan program is 
“to support enterprises in planning the 
entry to foreign markets and in consist-
ent implementation of  planned activi-
ties.” Further objectives were “to moti-
vate entrepreneurs to perceive the need 
for and benefits of  consistent planning 
of  export activities; to motivate entre-
preneurs to draw up and implement ex-
port plans; to support entrepreneurs in 
drawing up and implementing long-term 
export plans.”
• Considering the increasing trade deficit of  Estonia, development 
of  export remains very important.
• Due to the small size of  the Estonian economy the long-term 
competitiveness of  companies depends on their export capacity.
• Since the program has so far concerned few firms, it remains 
relevant.
Future opportunities:
• The export plan program is aimed at firms that have prior export 
experience, but at the same time enterprises that are about to 
start exporting certainly need support in developing their 
exports.
• The biggest problem in the case of  the export program lies in 
underspending – many projects were interrupted or only a part 
of  the planned activities was implemented. Four main reasons why 
projects were not implemented were:
- Various changes were made in the program conditions in 
2002-2004, as a result of  which the initially planned expenses 
approved by EE proved ineligible for support later.
- Though the former program conditions allowed for the 
redirection of  expenses to other cost items and, where 
necessary, other target markets (in the case of  a lapse of  a 
planned export market), in most cases mostly that was not 
backed.
- In addition to ineligible expenditure various eligible expenditures 
were also deprived of  co-financing. The reason lied in 
incorrect compilation of  the documentation required for 
compensation of  expenses, because firms did not have the 
necessary information.
- Also, the quality of  export plans proved weak in the process of  
implementation – the plans were unrealistic, the activities were 
poorly planned, unsuitable target markets were chosen, etc.
• Most of  the final recipients proceed from the maximum rate 
in applying for support. About half  of  the support is granted in 
the amount of  1 million kroons.
Future opportunities:
• To prevent the unexpected and/or frequent changes in the 
program conditions, because it usually has a negative impact on 
the effectiveness and impact of  the support.
• In order to identify underspending it is advisable to regularly 
monitor and gather information about the actual and potential 
use of  grant money.
Relevance / 
Design
Efficiency
31
• Many projects were not implemented to the planned extent. 
Some firms gave up implementation of  the project already at the 
beginning, some spent about a half  of  the support. 40% of  the 
respondents of  a web survey did not achieve the goals set.
• Most of  the final recipients replied that they would have 
implemented the export plans also without support, which 
refers to a high deadweight in the export activities on the whole, and 
thus the main net impact of  support can become evident in 
changes in the behaviour of  the company and in the approach 
to the export activities. 
• Although 80% of  the respondents of  the web survey replied that 
they would have drawn up export plans without the support or 
already had an export plan, it became evident in the interviews 
that they would have not done that in exactly the same manner as 
required in the program.
• 90% of  the respondents of  the web survey said that now they 
regularly update their plans of  activities in their export 
markets. However, it became evident during the interviews that 
none of  them had made a new export plan. The form of  the 
export plan was considered unsuitable for that – the reason lied in 
the excessive level of  detail.
Future opportunities:
• To avoid the unexpected and/or frequent changes in the 
conditions of  the program, because it usually has a negative 
impact on the effectiveness and impact of  the support.
• To make implementation of  the export plan much more 
flexible. A possible solution could be the following:
- To allocate support in a general sum and approve the export 
strategy and a detailed action plan for the first stage, but establish 
specific interim deadlines for project implementation. A report 
on the activities of  the previous stage and an action plan for 
the next stage would be submitted by the interim deadlines 
and a sum for the next stage would be allocated.37 This 
would allow for amendment of  the expenditure structure, where 
necessary, and obtaining feedback on the use of  the support, 
which would enable better overall planning of  the program 
activities.
- It is preferable to appoint a project manager in charge of  
each project who would also act at the interim deadlines (and 
in between) as a partner of  the firm regarding future project 
activities and as an advisor regarding the further action plan in 
the decision-making system of  EE.
• In order to prevent delays in using the funds some overall volume 
limits could be established in the program conditions for certain 
periods (e.g. years). In addition, at later stages the co-financing 
rate may be reduced, considering that the risk of  export activities 
decreases over time.
• Expansion of  the list of  eligible expenditure may be considered 
(in particular, the recruitment of  an export manager). However, the 
size of  the net impact and eligibility under the EU rules of  various 
cost items needs to be analysed beforehand.
37 Here the approval rather than a new application procedure has been kept in mind. 
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• According to 40% of  the web survey respondents, the support also 
affected activities in the home market in addition to export 
activities.
• Enterprises noted that good contacts for the future were established 
in the framework of  the project.
• A positive impact became evident in the rise of  the quality of  
advertising materials.
• Although 40% of  the respondents say that the support has not 
resulted in organisational changes, some enterprises have hired 
representatives in foreign markets or an export manager.
• It is positive that in comparison with the recipients of  other support, 
the beneficiaries of  the export plan program have actively used 
other support granted by EE as well.
• Many entrepreneurs noted that they received information about 
the value and relevance of  various marketing activities from 
the point of  view of  their firm.
• However, the quality of  export plans often proved insufficient 
in the course of  implementation. Therefore firms were deprived 
of  the experience of  successful export planning and the entry into 
the planned export market never took place.
Future opportunities:
• Since entrepreneurs often noted in the interviews that the structure 
of  the export plan does not fit in their overall system of  planning 
sales activities, the potential need for amending the structure 
of  the export plan should be examined. It is possible that it would 
be wiser to differentiate between the export strategy and a more 
detailed short-term action plan.
• More attention should be paid to ensuring the quality of  
export plans.
• Possibilities of  cooperation with KredEx in developing exports 
(e.g. communication of  each other’s services) should be examined.
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G. Export guarantee
The goal of  the export guarantee is “to 
increase the competitiveness of  Estonian 
enterprises, increase export volumes and 
create new jobs through better availability 
of  capital and reduction of  export risks.” 
However, in the case of  the short-term 
guarantees analysed upon this evaluation 
the direct impact on the economic perform-
ance of  enterprises has not been established 
as a goal. A further goal of  the export guar-
antee is to support the development of  the 
private credit insurance market in Estonia.
• Although various private credit insurers have entered the market, 
there is a market failure in the case of  high-risk target countries. 
Estonian factoring companies do not offer insurance for various 
riskier eastern markets (notably the CIS states) and foreign insurers 
are available only for large corporations. No direct interest in 
insuring riskier transactions could be noticed in the course of  
interviews. Thus, as far as this kind of  transactions are concerned, 
the provision of  the state export guarantee may be considered 
relevant. The private sector may also not be interested in small 
enterprises that want to insure smaller or single transactions.
• Factoring companies / banks refer clients who have addressed them 
for the purpose of  obtaining insurance to KredEx only in the case 
of  transactions that they do not want to insure. Thus, KredEx does 
not compete with the private market and these transactions 
would not have been insured if  it weren’t for KredEx’s export 
guarantees (or they would not have taken place at all).
• The need for the export guarantee is also confirmed by the 
calculated use of  KredEx’s products in the case of  only 
selected products.
• State export guarantees corresponded to the client’s needs 
and expectation in the evaluated period. But this may not be 
true any longer due to the restrictions on state aid which entered 
into force as of  2005, because these days only a very limited portion 
of  risks is ensured.
• Clients highly value KredEx’s client friendliness and are 
satisfied with communicating with KredEx.
Future opportunities:
• In the case of  medium-term and long-term export guarantees 
the existence of  a market failure may be presumed. However, 
the respective products of  KredEx have not been successfully 
launched. We recommend that the demand for the given products, 
the cost-effectiveness and the correspondence to the state’s 
economic policy goals be investigated.
• The coverage of  the export guarantee is modest. Through 
2002-2003 there were 2,346 exporting companies in Estonia38, but 
through 2002-2004 only 128 companies, i.e. 5.5% used KredEx’s 
export guarantees. By today the number of  companies using the 
export guarantees has fallen to 36.
• If  the volumes of  the export guarantee continue falling, the 
provision of  the guarantees may not be self-sustaining. First, 
in the case of  low volume it is difficult to spread risks. Second, 
38 Survey of  Estonian exporters 2003. EMOR, 2003.
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the share of  administrative expenses would increase.39 Both 
developments may drive the price of  the guarantee up too high 
(which would reduce the demand and guarantee volumes).
• Since the private sector is currently not interested in providing 
guarantees to riskier transactions it cannot be concluded that the 
provision of  these guarantees by the state is more efficient than by 
the private sector.
Future opportunities:
• If  the number of  clients and the volumes of  the export 
guarantee continue decreasing, the provision of  the guarantee 
may not remain self-sustaining. To ensure self-sustainability 
the price of  the guarantee should be increased. This may, in turn, 
reduce the demand and guarantee volumes. In connection with 
the limits of  state aid that entered into force in 2005, i.e. the 
prohibition to guarantee exports directed to the EU and OECD 
the export turnover secured with short-term guarantees has fallen 
considerably over the last two years and payments for losses have 
exceeded premiums. Since KredEx is serving a relatively small 
guarantee niche, it is unlikely that former volumes will be restored 
in the case of  short-term guarantees. Two possible solutions for the 
future include, for instance:
- increasing guarantee volumes through medium-term and long-term 
export guarantees. Since it is a product aimed at a small circle of  
companies it calls for a strategic decision by the state, because the 
spreading of  risks will be inevitably modest. According to KredEx, 
the product has not been successfully launched primarily due to 
their lack of  capital and restricting risk standards.
- state subsidy for short-term export guarantees to ensure 
feasibility.
• KredEx’s export guarantees have increased trade volume. 
This applies directly (on the supply side), by supporting the firm’s 
decision to enter into a transaction with the specific buyer, as well 
as through the fact that the firms have greater opportunities for 
reaching a deal, because they could offer better terms of  payment 
to their partners (on the demand side).
• Often, the transactions guaranteed by KredEx are aimed at new 
markets or a new partner of  a company (nearly half  of  the web survey 
respondents) and most companies are still active on these markets and 
most of  them have the very same partners (often without a guarantee). 
The number of  target export countries has increased over the years. 
Thus, KredEx has contributed to entry into new markets.
• Through 2004-2005 the share of  guaranteed export exceeded 0.8% 
of  exports in Estonia and KredEx achieved the goal (set in 2003) of  
bringing the share of  guaranteed export volume to 0.75%. However, 
over the last year the indicator has fallen considerably (to 0.5%).
• It is positive that the guarantee volumes and share of  Russia 
and CIS states in the portfolio have increased in the last few 
years (albeit remaining at a low level on the whole – only less than 
0.5% of  the total exports of  Estonian enterprises to this region is 
covered with KredEx’s guarantees40).
Effectiveness
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• Enterprises see the coverage of  commercial risks relating to buyers 
as the main benefit of  the guarantee. Another important advantage 
noted by entrepreneurs lies in the possibility of  offering better terms 
of  payment for the buyer. Thus, entrepreneurs value aspects of  
guarantee which affect provision of  export as well as demand.
• The additionality is high. Most of  the transactions could not have 
been insured elsewhere if  it weren’t for KredEx’s guarantee. Although 
most of  the transactions would have been concluded without a 
guarantee, their volume would have been smaller and the terms of  
payment would have been worse for the buyer (e.g. advance payment 
would have been asked). Also, the absence of  the guarantee would 
have had a negative impact on the working capital of  the firm, if  the 
guarantee was a prerequisite for entry into a factoring transaction.
• 1/4 of  the clients have had loss claims through 2002-2006.41 
However, many of  them ended with the payment of  an invoice 
by the buyer. In the interviews it was noted that even if  the non-
payment on the transactions would have put the firm in a difficult 
situation in some instances had they not had the guarantee, the 
transactions were not big enough to be fatal for the firm.
• In recent years the number of  exporters and buyers using KredEx’s 
guarantee has dramatically decreased due to changes in product 
conditions.
Future opportunities:
• The share of  export volume in Estonian export has dramatically fallen 
in recent years and due to restrictions on state aid it is unlikely that short-
term guarantees will achieve the former high volumes. It is advisable to 
consider revision of  indicator’s target level taking that into account.
• Sometimes a KredEx’s guarantee is a prerequisite for obtaining 
factoring and thus also for increasing working capital without which 
the company would be unable to enter into export transactions on 
the same scale.
• Half  of  the web survey respondents found that using the KredEx’s 
guarantee has had an impact on the risk management system of  
their company.
• One of  the goals of  KredEx was to contribute to the development of  
the private credit insurance market. In comparison with the first years 
of  KredEx’s operation various private insurers have entered the 
market, but they mostly guarantee short-term export transactions. 
KredEx’s activities in raising entrepreneurs’ awareness have certainly 
had a positive impact in private sector development.
• While the transactions guaranteed by KredEx were aimed at new 
markets or a new partner of  a company (nearly half  of  the web 
survey respondents), the companies are mostly active on these 
markets to date and most of  them also have the very same partners 
(often without a guarantee).
Spillovers
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40 The author’s calculation based on KredEx’s database and the balance of  payments data from Eesti Pank.
41 KredEx’s database
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H. Investment loan and leasing 
guarantee
The goal of  the measure of  loan 
and leasing guarantee is “to increase 
competitiveness and create new jobs 
through improving enterprises’ access 
to capital.”
• The program corresponds to the goals established in policy 
documents and has contributed to elimination of  the market 
failure, i.e. has improved enterprises’ access to capital.
• The program remains relevant. Although financial problems are 
no longer as serious a problem for Estonian firms as they were 
a few years ago, there are firms that, regardless of  the economic 
conjuncture and the situation in the loan market, lack collateral for 
obtaining a loan. Start-ups, smaller enterprises and rural enterprises 
have difficulties.
• Although the established goals describe start-ups, micro 
enterprises and enterprises of  less developed areas as the preferred 
target groups, the respective preferences are not manifested in 
the process of  assessing of  guarantee applications. Thus, the 
target levels of  the indicators are rather forecasts (of  what 
the distribution of  demand-based guarantee might turn out to be) 
than real goals.
• According to KredEx, taking other aspects into account upon 
assessment of  applications besides economic cost-effectiveness 
would call for additional support by the state. But since KredEx 
is self-sustaining, it does not want to take excessive risks (i.e. 
problematic target groups are not preferred), but guarantee 
is provided to projects that can get loans, but firms lack 
necessary collateral.
• Although in the real process of  assessment of  applications the 
enterprises of  no target group are given preference over another, 
the demand-based distribution of  guarantee has resulted in a 
relatively high share of  the clients of  the desired target groups being 
supported (start-ups, micro enterprises and enterprises operating in 
less developed regions).
• A good program design hinders occurrence of  deadweight 
and ensures high additionality (most of  the projects would not 
have been implemented without the guarantee).
• The firms are quite pleased with the size of  the guarantee fee, 
especially those that would not have been able to implement their 
project without the guarantee.
• There were shortcomings in the monitoring system during the 
evaluated period (2002-2004). Several of  the established indicators 
are not considered reasonable by KredEx and no information is 
gathered on attainment of  the indicators (as a result of  which it 
has not been possible to evaluate the attainment of  the goals, e.g. 
favouring achievement of  regional balance). By today the situation 
has changed – new indicators where approved in 2006.
Future opportunities:
• To clarify the indicators and improve the monitoring system (more 
detailed proposals in the report of  the program).
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• In general KredEx is highly valued and the firms that communicated 
with KredEx (many of  the users of  the guarantee do not have any 
direct contacts with KredEx) found the communication swift and 
effective.
• Firms usually end up using KredEx’s guarantee via banks, 
i.e. banks play an important role from the point of  view of  
implementation of  the program. So far advising firms to use 
the guarantee has largely depended on the client relationship 
managers – some recommend KredEx much more often than 
others. Such practice may result in unequal opportunities for 
entrepreneurs.
• One group of  entrepreneurs had not quite grasped why they 
needed the guarantee and could not comment on the size of  the 
guarantee fee. The bank’s requirements were fulfilled at the time of  
applying for a loan (incl. using KredEx) without getting into details, 
because they wanted to get a loan quickly. Such ignorance may cause 
dissatisfaction (because people do not understand the benefits of  
the guarantee) and reduce the preparedness to use KredEx the next 
time or recommend it to others.
• KredEx’s guarantee concern a very small market share of  
commercial loans (according to estimates, a few percentages of  
all commercial loans), which means that the impact obtained is not 
very high when having the entire business sector in mind. However, 
KredEx has achieved its goals in terms of  the volume and the 
number of  guarantee users.
• The share of  rejected applications has fallen, referring to a rise in 
the effectiveness of  the measure.
Future opportunities:
• More attention should be paid to raising awareness. On the 
one hand, this would ensure equal opportunities for firms in using 
KredEx’s products. On the other hand, it would allow for reaching 
potential clients who belong to program’s target groups and who 
have not been reached so far. Furthermore, higher awareness 
would give clients a better overview of  the possible alternatives 
to pledging their personal property. 
• The additionality is relatively high (projects would not 
have been implemented without the guarantee). However, the 
ignorance of  the users of  the guarantee makes evaluation of  
additionality difficult – several respondents admitted that they do 
not actually know if  they would have received a loan without the 
guarantee and on what conditions, because they did not look for 
alternatives and therefore were unable to evaluate the situation 
objectively.
• The relatively high additionality has been supported by guaranteeing 
the right target groups – additionality is higher in the case of  smaller 
enterprises.
• The main impact indicators included the growth of  turnover and 
jobs created. It became evident that projects financed with the help 
of  the guarantee contributed more to the growth of  turnover 
than to creation of  new jobs.
• KredEx had established the goal of  creating 1,500-2,000 new jobs 
by 2006 with the help of  business guarantee. By 2005 nearly 1,600 
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jobs had been created in the firms guaranteed through 2002-2004 
(excl. guarantee of  working capital loans contained in KredEx’s 
forecast). However, there is not enough information to clarify how 
large a portion of  the new jobs were created directly with the help 
of  guarantee, which makes it difficult to evaluate the attainment of  
the established goal.
• There was no accurate target level for the growth of  turnover. 
According to the commercial register, up to 84% of  the enterprises 
that used the guarantee through 2002-2004 have increased their 
turnover.
• The program had a positive impact on regional development – 
firms from Tallinn were relatively modestly represented among the 
clients of  KredEx in comparison with their high share among all 
Estonian enterprises.
• For many companies the investment made with the help 
of  guarantee was important from the point of  view of  their 
survival.
Future opportunities:
• As of  2006 the program’s focus and the expected impacts have 
changed a lot. Before, the supporting of  start-ups and micro 
enterprises whose growth ambitions were not very high and 
whose supported investments were often important for their 
survival was emphasised. Now it is aimed at target groups that 
have high growth potential, and a rapid growth of  turnover and 
value added is expected from the supported enterprises. However, 
no new goals are kept in mind upon appraising of  applications, 
as a result of  which the type of  supported firms and the impact 
of  the program may still remain the same (only the evaluated 
indicators change).
• After taking a loan with KredEx’s help the usage of  new loans 
is much more active afterwards. Thus, the desired result has been 
achieved – enterprises have better opportunities for getting a 
loan afterwards.
• However, many enterprises have used the guarantee again when 
applying for a loan afterwards, although it could be expected that 
they could get a loan without guarantee. These are probably young 
and rapidly growing enterprises that still lack assets.
• They did not obtain much new knowledge from the communication 
with KredEx or banks. The entrepreneurs who used the assistance of  
an external advisor in preparing documents required for obtaining a 
loan did acquire new knowledge and skills (40% of  the web survey 
participants). A half  of  those interviewed found the business plan 
useful in further work. The desire and preparedness to use external 
advisors has increased, but it is impeded by difficulties in finding a 
suitable advisor.
Future opportunities:
• The experience of  other states shows that the effectiveness of  the 
program (especially Spillovers) increases when financial support 
is provided in combination with counselling. This ensured that 
the implemented project is sufficiently thought through and in 
line with the strategic development plans of  the enterprise. One 
Spillovers
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of  the possibilities towards this end would be more extensive 
integration of  the products of  KredEx and EE (e.g. KredEx 
and banks recommend using the counselling services financed by 
EE, distribute respective leaflets, etc.).
• According to the staff  of  KredEx, with the slowdown of  economic 
growth the demand for KredEx guarantee will rather rise than fall 
(banks want to hedge their risks).
• The sustainability of  the supported projects depends largely 
on the substance of  the investment. In the present market 
situation where there is a lack of  labour force and wages rise faster 
than productivity the development of  new products and services, 
increasing effectiveness and acquisition of  new equipment are 
key issues for many enterprises from the point of  view of  their 
survival. In the course of  the analysis it became evident that projects 
financed with the help of  KredEx were often aimed at solving such 
problems, which gives reason to believe that the guarantee has 
helped to secure the future of  firms and prepare them for more 
difficult times.
• One KredEx’s problem lies in its lack of  capital – due to the 
standards of  enterprises’ own funds provided by law it may not be 
possible to grant any additional collateral in the near future. This 
may threaten as active continuance of  the past work.
Sustainability
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